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West African Monetary Institute Accra, Ghana

Abstract
This paper essentially explores how to
invest African reserves on the
continent. The paper underlined the
challenges and opportunities for
managing Africa's external reserves
by Africans after identifying several
pre-conditions for an African currency
to emerge as international currency
and noted that these conditions have
not yet crystallized in Africa. Although
African external reserves have grown
over time the benefits of such growth
in terms of facilitation of domestic
financial markets and even the
earning are not commensurate with
the reserves growth rate. The nonconvertibility of African currencies,
volatile macroeconomic and
sometimes volatile political
environment coupled with the
shallowness of the domestic markets
are the main challenges that are faced
by the continent. However, with
recapitalization of the African financial
institutions especially banks and the
attainment of stable polity in both
economic and political fronts, there is
hope for the continent's institutions to
take their rightful place in the emerging
global financial system by first using
the African resources as the first step.
The involvement of creditable African
financial institutions in the
management of the reserves either
within or outside Africa will in no small
2

measure strengthen the development
of the African financial system but also
ensure that a bulk of African resources
work for Africa as the difference
between what the current fund
managers paid to the African central
banks and what they actually get as
commission or profits will be retained
explicitly or implicitly in Africa. Africa's
financial systems have been
deepening and broadening over the
past years, the result not only of
improvements in the macroeconomic
and institutional framework, but also of
the worldwide liquidity glut, which
directed more capital flows into Africa.
The current global crisis threatens to
reverse this trend and undermine
recent progress. In these adverse
circumstances, it is even more
important to upgrade the necessary
frameworks for sound, efficient, and
inclusive financial systems. This call
for further institution building as well as
cautious and case-by-case
government intervention to aid
financial market participants expand
financial services to the frontier of
commercially sustainable
possibilities.
JEL Classification: C19, C22 C59,
E45
Keywords: External Reserves,
International Reserves Currency,
Financial Markets
Introduction
Over the last few years, there has been
considerable build up of foreign exchange
reserves by some central banks of
developing economies including some
African countries, particularly in the

aftermath of the East Asian crisis of the
late 1990s. Foreign exchange reserves
held by developing countries have risen
from 56.9 percent of global reserves to
over 62.0 percent between 2000 and
2007. The growth in the international
reserves of African countries is striking
when compared with the
contemporaneous trends in reserves in
industrial countries. Whereas reserves in
a group of industrial countries as a
percentage of world reserves declined
from 43.0 per cent in 2000 to 37.8per cent
in 2007, that of African countries
increased from 3.8 per cent to 6.3 per cent
during the same period. The recent global
financial crisis has brought to the fore the
danger of concentrating external reserves
investment in a particular currency and/or
country.
Much of Africa's external reserves
accumulation was accounted for by the oil
producingAfrican countries. However, the
increase in the world price of non-oil
commodities also contributed to reserves
accumulation by other countries. The
buildup in reserves is seen as insurance
against the increased volatility of capital
flows associated with financial
globalization.
In general, official foreign exchange
reserves are held to meet a battery of
objectives including, safeguarding the
external value of the domestic currency,
limiting the vulnerability arising from
external shocks, providing a level of
confidence to markets; and assisting the
government in meeting its foreign
exchange needs and external debt
obligations.

Table 1 : International Reserves (%)
2000
2003
2006
Africa / Developing Countries 6.68
6.70
10.91
Africa / World
3.80
4.07
6.06
43.04
39.27
44.48
Developed Countries/ World
Developing Countries / World 56.96
60.73
55.52
Source: IMF/IFS Tables
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2007
10.11
6.29
37.77
62.23
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To effectively implement these objectives,
the external reserves of countries are
expected to be managed optimally.
By their dealings in the financial markets,
reserve managers gain access to
important information that keep policy
makers informed of market developments
including potential threats. The
importance of appropriate practices has
also been underscored by experiences
where fragile or risky reserve
management practices have restricted
the ability of the authorities to respond
efficiently to financial crises, which may
have heightened the harshness of the
crises.
Weak or risky reserve management can
also have major financial costs. A few
countries, have sustained large losses
that translate into colossal fiscal
consequences. Accordingly, appropriate
portfolio management policies
concerning the currency composition,
choice of investment instruments, and
acceptable duration of the reserves
portfolio, which reflect a country's specific
policy settings and circumstances, serve
to ensure that assets are safeguarded,
readily available and support market
confidence (IMF, 2003).
Incidentally, most of the world reserves
are held in the internationally traded
currencies. None of theAfrican currencies
is currently serving as a reserves
currency. This development implies that
the continent's external reserves are
entirely invested outside of the continent.
This is a classical element of what
Lawrence Summers calls the capital flows
paradox as capital is flowing upstream
from less developed African countries
toward the industrialized countries,
mainly the United States. However, a
pertinent question to ask is: what are the
impediments that militate against African
countries investing their external reserves
in the continent? This paper seeks to
underline the challenges and
opportunities of investing Africa's external
reserves inAfrica.
The remaining part of the paper is
arranged thus: Part II dwells on
conceptual and theoretical issues. Part III
adumbrates the challenges confronting
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African countries with respect to investing
foreign reserves in Africa. Part IV
examines the way forward. Part V
contains the summary, recommendations
and the concluding remarks.
II. Conceptual/Theoretical Issues
Foreign exchange reserves are defined
as external stock of assets, which are
available to the country's monetary
authorities to cover external payment
imbalances or to influence the exchange
rate of the domestic currency through
intervention in foreign exchange market,
or for other purposes (IMF, 2000). A
country's reserve consists of gold, foreign
currencies, Special Drawing Rights
(SDR) and the reserve position with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Previously under the Bretton-Woods
system, the foreign exchange reserves
were utilized by central banks to maintain
the external value of their respective
currencies under the then fixed exchange
regime. However, following the break
down of Bretton-Woods system in the
early 1970s, countries started adopting
relatively flexible exchange rate regimes,
under which the reserves assumed a less
important role.
International currency reserves have
largely been viewed as inventory held
against an uncertain future in the balance
of payment accounts. The uncertainty is
largely due to the status of the current
account, where adequacy level is
adjudged by the size of trade flow. This
reasoning is derived from the fact that
international trade historically accounts
for the largest factor in the balance of
payments. Consequently, to assess
levels of reserves, the first benchmark
ideally should be the reserves to imports
(R M) ratio. The ( R M) ratio of a country is the
number of months of normal imports
capable of being financed by its
international currency reserves. IMF
(1958) indicated that, in general,
countries achieve an annual (R M) Ratio of
between 30.0 and 50.0 percent.
Admittedly, this minimum benchmark
figure has been a matter of debate.
However a three to four months worth of
import consensus has emerged over the
years (Fischer, 2001).

24

Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) developed
a solution for optimal reserve levels using
the (R M) ratio approach. They incorporated
interest rates, an allowance for trend
movement governing international
payments and receipts, and the mean
rate of net payments. The demand for
reserves is a function of benefits in the
form of smooth external transactions
(trade) and a negative function of the
opportunity cost (forgone earnings) of
holding them. However, their assumption
for interest rate as a measure of forgone
earnings may not be appropriate; thus the
approach described by the authors is
merely indicative.
Economic theory postulates that reserve
holdings will rise in tandem with economic
size. Similarly, a high ratio of import to
GDP, high trade to GDP, and high current
account deficit to GDP may lead to current
account vulnerability and this may in turn
induce high reserve demand. In the same
vein, a high ratio of capital account deficit
to GDP, high short-term debt to GDP, and
high broad money to GDP could be
associated with higher capital account
vulnerability and this may lead to a
demand for reserve holdings. Greater
exchange rate flexibility would reduce the
demand for reserves because central
banks no longer need a large stock of
reserves to manage a pegged exchange
rate. Also, a higher opportunity cost is
expected to lead to a reduction in reserve
holdings because alternative investments
become comparatively attractive.
Clark (1970) developed a theoretical
relationship between demand for
reserves and cost of adjustment in the
economy. He noted that the benefit of
reserve holdings is simply the avoidance
of the cost of adjustments. Reserves help
to pursue domestic policy goals in the
face of temporary deterioration in the
Balance of Payments (BoP). The
disturbance in BoP is either financed from
reserves or eliminated by adjustments
within the economy through appropriate
government policies. He opined that the
two policies implied different cost to the
country. For instance, if a country holds a
higher level of reserves as buffer, the
domestic investment will be low and there
will be a reduction of income. If a country
prefers a high speed of adjustment due to
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low reserves, this will lead to high
variability in income. Consequently, the
preferred position is to maximize the
welfare of a country by deriving an
optimum combination of level of reserve
and the rate of speed of adjustment.
The IMF (2003) examined the demand for
foreign exchange reserves in emerging
economies in the 1980s and 1990s. The
results reveal that more than 90.0 per cent
of variation in reserves is explained by
economic size, current account
vulnerability, capital account vulnerability,
exchange rate flexibility and opportunity
cost.
Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) provide an
approach where international currency
reserve demand depends on the marginal
propensity to import, a change in the
balance of payments and the opportunity
cost of holding the reserves. Even in this
arrangement, there has been a difference
of opinion on the assumed relationship of
the reserve demand function and
tendency to import. A negative
relationship is expected as currency
reserves are built by import policies
including reduction in aggregate
expenditure.
FrenkeI (1978) argues that a high (low)
import-GDP ratio reflects a high (low)
openness of an economy which reflects
vulnerability to external shock by
presenting evidence on the stability of the
demand. The demand for reserves by
developed countries differs from that of
less-developed countries. Consequently,
a positive relationship is expected
between reserve demand and propensity
to import.
Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) take a
different perspective by taking into
account sovereign risk in their model for
optimal international currency reserves
and find the variable in their risk premium
equations significant. The cost and
probability of levels of reserves can be
related to the default of external debt.
Countries with default on external debt
incur a higher borrowing cost; hence the
level of international currency reserves
depends on the credibility rating of the
country.

Oct./Dec. 2008

A sudden drain on a country's reserves
may hurt creditor's confidence regarding
the borrowing countries ability to meet its
payment obligations. Once a lender
losses confidence in the borrowing
government, it will be unable to restore
assurances about the stability of its
reserves which are likely to decrease
rapidly. The rate at which the reserves
deplete may further hurt the confidence in
the borrowing country. However, for most
developed countries which usually have a
lower default risk rating, need for a large
safety net is unjustified since they can
borrow in world capital market as
requirement arises (Flood and Marion,
2001).
An alternative view on reserve
accumulation is that it is the by-product of
a government strategy to keep the
international value of the domestic
currency low in order to boost export
growth. In this view purchases of foreign
reserves are not motivated by a desire to
smooth consumption in the face of
external shocks, but rather they are the
unintended consequence of sterilized
interventions in the foreign exchange
market. Fatum and Hutchison (2003)
explore the efficacy of sterilized
intervention policy. In the traditional
portfolio balance model sterilized
intervention can only be effective if
domestic and foreign assets are imperfect
substitutes and Ricardian equivalence
holds.
There have been a number of recent
empirical studies attempting to measure
whether the precautionary or mercantilist
motive better explains foreign reserve
accumulations by both industrialized and
developing countries. These studies
generally find evidence in support of both
motivations, while at the same time
finding that neither motivation fully
explains the recent upsurge in reserve
accumulations by developing countries
(Jeanne, 2007).
However, a notable exception is a study
by Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor
(2007) which suggests that if reserve
adequacy is gauged against the size of
the banking sector, the recent reserves
accumulation in emerging markets is less
puzzling. The rationale for reserve
25

accumulation, typically labeled the
mercantilist motive, has been advanced
by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber
(2003) as a description of the
development strategy followed by many
EastAsian countries, particularly China.
The literature has identified five major
factors that could facilitate the emergence
of a currency as an international currency
and by extension, a reserve currency.
These include large economic size,
well-developed financial system,
confidence in the currency's value,
and political stability (Chinn and
Frankel, 2005).
Reserves currencies are typically linked
with large, competitive economies, mainly
those with extensive trade and financial
ties. Such an economy will usually
generate a large market in foreign
exchange transactions with at least one
strut in its own currency. Large market
size has a tendency to effect lower
transaction costs, reflecting economies of
scale in financial resource management.
That is, while large costs may be
associated with installing the essential
software, hardware, trading, and clearing
systems, when installed, these
investments can accommodate many
more transactions without incurring
additional cost. Consequently, marginal
costs are negligible and average costs
drop with scale, bringing about lower
transaction costs.
International currencies which might also
serve as a reserve currencies are
generally linked with open, liquid, and
well-developed financial systems. When
sterling was the dominant international
currency in the 19th and early 20th
centuries, London was the world's
superlative financial market. Presently,
the dollar is backed by the deep, liquid,
and well-diversified financial markets in
New York. A well-developed financial
system enhances the attractiveness of
the domestic currency. It provides deep
and liquid secondary markets for
securities to global market participants;
who do not usually hold their international
money in the form of currency balances,
but as alternative need liquid, interestbearing assets of a short-term risk-free
instrument, to hold their temporary
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positions.
Cooper (1997) notes that the liquid
secondary markets allow participants to
quickly build up or liquidate large
positions in the currency without dread of
capital loss. A well-developed financial
system offers a wide range of subsidiary
services proficiently to international
market participants, who may want to
borrow or invest in the domestic currency,
or hedge their foreign currency positions.
Greenspan (2001) opines that a welldeveloped financial system is more apt to
attract business from abroad, where
financial markets may be less developed
or barriers to efficiency exist. This
possibility makes it cheaper for market
participants to borrow or invest abroad in
an international currency and then
exchange the proceeds for domestic
currency, rather than conduct the
transactions domestically.
International currencies (reserves
currencies) are also held as stores of
value, such as the short-term instruments
noted above, working balances, and
international bonds, etc. Consequently,
an international currency must be
perceived as sound, with stable future
value in terms of goods and services it can
command. Volatility in value raises
holding risk, and inflation obliterates
purchasing power. The prevalence of
these elements would discourage
investors from holding assets in that
currency. Friedman (1971) noted that no
exchange medium can survive if it is not
also a store of value (although the
converse does not necessarily hold).
Confidence in a currency's value is also
imperative indirectly for its medium-ofexchange function. However, noted by
(Hartmann, 1998), since investors seek to
curtail risk through diversification, an
array of international currencies is likely to
coexist as stores of value at any one time.
Indeed, contemporary portfolio theory
advocates that efficient portfolios are
likely to be diversified over several
currencies.
Political stability is specially underscored
by most economists. For instance,
Mundell (1998) observes that when a
state collapses, the currency goes up in
smoke. He underpinned the strong
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chronological link between international
currencies and strong central states,
because strength implies political
stability, which also facilitates the pursuit
of monetary stability. In the same way,
Bordo (2003) and Dwyer and Lothian
(2003) indicate that national monetary
unions, where monetary integration is tied
to political union, have historically been
stable (e.g. the United States). On the
other hand, international monetary
unions, where monetary integration is not
tied to political union, have historically
failed (e.g. the Scandinavian Monetary
Union). The reason is that shocks may
affect each national member differently
and give rise to pressures that weaken the
political will to maintain the union.
Net externalities, a trend associated with
international currencies whereby a good
or service becomes more valuable as
more people use it has been identified as
one of the factors that facilitates the
emergence of a currency as an
international currency and by extension a
reserve currency. Varian (2003)
summarizes three features of net
externalities. Network externalities are
efficiencies because they increase
average revenue (or demand) with scale,
in contrast to the technical or supply-side
economics, which decrease average cost
with scale.
Many network goods also exhibit supplyside returns to scale, making the positive
feedback extremely strong. That is, more
sales lead to lower unit costs (supply side)
and greater appeal to customers
(demand side). Strong positive feedback
is likely to drive the network good to
market dominance; and once dominance
has been achieved, it becomes extremely
difficult to unseat it. Applying this concept
to the currency implies that a currency
becomes more useful if more people are
using it. The larger the dollar's network of
users, the more attractive the dollar
becomes to a user. The demand-side
economies derive from the currency's
increased liquidity, which results because
a larger network implies more potential
counteroffers for a trade, thus enhancing
the probability of a favorable match and
quick sale. The increased liquidity then
induces even more people to join the
network, resulting in a self-reinforcing
26

cycle.
Krugman (1984) indicates that an
expanding network and market size
reduces average cost with scale. In
addition, large market size tends to
reduce the average waiting time between
matching buy/sell orders, allowing
market-making banks to carry smaller
(costly) inventories of currency, which
also reduces cost.
III.0
Challenges of Investing
African Countries' Reserves in Africa
Before discussing the challenges faced
by the African countries in investing
reserves in the continent. It is germane to
examine briefly the nuances that have
aided the American dollars as the reserve
currency over time. The dollar has
maintained the role of international
reserves currency over the years, despite
substantial fluctuations in its exchange
value, because the size, sophistication,
and relative stability of the US economy
generally render the costs of transacting
in US dollars lower than the costs of
transacting in currencies that do not
equally share these characteristics.
In large part, the widespread use of the
dollar developed and continued because
the US has been the largest, most broadbased exporter and importer in the world.
With a lot of Americans trading globally, a
lot of dollars naturally change hands.
Because traders must finance a large
portion of their business in US dollars,
they maintain accounts, seek loans, and
undertake myriad other financial
arrangements in dollars.
A strong and open US financial system
facilitates the dollar's international use.
While a high degree of feedback naturally
exists between the dollar's expanding role
in trade and the growth of an
accommodating financial structure, US
financial markets have always been
innovative and relatively free of
cumbersome regulations. Their breadth
and depth enhances the liquidity of dollardenominated assets. Moreover, as dollar
trade expands and US financial markets
grow, more and more foreign financial
firms, including those not located in the
US, offer dollar-denominated products.
This makes holding dollars convenient
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and transacting in dollars relatively easy.
As the global network for dollars expands,
the benefits of using the dollar in
exchange rise. The process is selfreinforcing. Moreover, once the network
benefits of a particular currency become
substantial, people are prone to continue
using it, even if viable competitor exists.
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years may reflect the simple fact that
fewer countries formally peg to the dollar
than was the case in the mid-1970s, and
that their trading pattern is less focused
on dollar area countries.
All in all, it appears that the two thirds
share has held up remarkably despite a
net decline over the past thirty three years
of some 16.0 per cent in the value of the
dollar against a weighted basket of other
major currencies and its secular declines
of 24.0 per cent and 44.0 per cent against
the euro and the yen, respectively.

investments in other US sovereign, semisovereign and Agency paper, as well as
US private (mortgage and corporate)
bonds. US corporate equities also attract
a surprisingly large amount of official
investment, reflecting placements by
central bank and other public long-term
investment funds and central bank inhouse pension funds. In addition, central
bank reserve managers have extended
the duration of their portfolios, and now
hold most of their dollars in long-term
instruments.

Since the peak in the US dollar's effective
exchange rate in early 2002, the global
stock of foreign exchange reserves has
continued to grow rapidly. Between 2001
and 2005, official international reserves
doubled, compared with cumulative
Perhaps a prefatory point of departure in
global trade growth of two thirds and This remarkable persistence and assessing the challenges confronting
global nominal GDP growth of two fifths. resilience of the dollar as a reserve A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s i n t h e
Some of this expansion presumably currency reflects several factors, investment/management of their external
reflects central banks' conscious decision including the liquidity of US financial reserves in the continent is a brief
to accumulate precautionary reserves, markets and network externalities that appraisal of theAfrican financial system.
particularly in the case of those countries lead to inertia in the use of vehicle
that were affected by the Asian financial currencies. Support has also come from African financial systems are small, both
crisis of 1997-98. But there can be
in absolute and relative terms. In
little doubt that most of the recent
addition, Africa's financial systems
Figure 1:Currency composition of official foreign
accumulation of official
are characterized by very limited
exchange reserves end 2007 in percentage of total
international reserves has resulted
outreach, with less than one in five
from purchases of dollars to limit
households having access to any
the appreciation of the currencies
formal banking service (World
of a number of countries. From this
Bank, 2007). Banking is inefficient
perspective, central bank reserve
and expensive in Africa, as
accumulation has been more an
reflected by high interest spreads
instrument than a goal of national
and margins and high overhead
monetary and financial policy.
costs. Banking is also very
expensive for deposit customers,
In the management of foreign
as reflected by very high minimum
reserves, two policy issues arise.
balance requirements and annual
The first is their allocation by
fees in many African countries
the
sustained
share
of
global
output
currency; the second is their allocation
(Beck et al. 2008). High documentation
across instruments. The currency produced by countries that we can think of requirements to open an account that is,
allocation of global foreign exchange as being part of a broadly defined dollar the need to present several documents of
reserves has remained relatively stable zone in the sense that their currencies identification also represent significant
over the past few decades, while the tend to move in tandem with the dollar. barriers given that large parts of the
instrument allocation has changed Today, most of the currencies of the population live and work in the informal
Middle East and Asia fluctuate less sector. Similarly, physical access is
significantly.
against the dollar than against the euro or limited, as the low bank branch and ATM
Heller and Knight (1978) found that in yen.
penetration numbers forAfrica illustrate.
1975 dollar share in foreign reserves was
80.0 per cent. Available data as at 2007 In contrast, the allocation of foreign However, standard indicators of financial
put this share at about two thirds. Indeed, reserves by instrument has changed intermediary development, such as the
this ratio has shown intriguing stability markedly. A cursory perusal on official ratios of liquid liabilities to GDP, bank
over time. On the average, countries tend foreign exchange reserves held in US deposits to GDP, and private credit to
to hold 66.0 per cent of their foreign- dollars indicates that since the 1960s the GDP have shown financial deepening in
exchange reserves in dollars ... proportion held in US Treasury securities most African countries in recent years. As
independently of their trading patterns has declined significantly. Today, credit has been growing faster than
and exchange arrangements. In other probably less than half of central banks' deposits in most countries, financial
words, the modest decline of dollar US dollar reserves are invested in US intermediation, that is, the extent to which
holdings from 80.0 per cent of central Treasuries.
banks intermediate society's savings into
bank reserves to 66.0 per cent over 32
private credit, has also increased,
These holdings have declined in favour of
27
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Seychelles,
Ghana, Kenya,
Mozambique,
Nigeria, Tanzania,
Uganda, and
Zambia). Though
they vary in their
degree of
f i n a n c i a l
development, the
linkages between
f i n a n c i a l
segments and
with global
markets are fewer
than in emerging
markets. Foreign
investors have
increasingly
participated in
local and debt
m a r k e t s .
F i n a n c i a l
products are
evolving and
gradually more
sophisticated.

although from very low levels. Although
not documented in a statistical sense,
there seems to have been progress in
expanding outreach as well.
African financial system is
heterogeneous. Financial market
structure and degree of development vary
significantly across African countries.
Three groups of countries can be
identified on the basis of financial depth
indicators and capital market
development. Promising markets: South
Africa, the only emerging market in the
region, has a well-developed financial
system with a full continuum of market
segments that are interconnected and
integrated with global markets. The
financial system includes subsidiaries of

foreign-owned banks and insurance
companies; large domestic financial
conglomerates, asset management firms,
insurance companies, and pension funds,
many with significant cross border
operations in sub-Saharan Africa and
other regions; and nonresident and
institutional investors (pensions,
insurance, hedge funds) that invest
heavily in equities and debt markets.
Sovereign and corporate debt issuers are
active in both domestic and international
markets, and may issue in South Africa's
own currency in developed offshore
markets.
Border market countries: This group
consists of twelve countries (Botswana,
Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, and

28

Underdeveloped
markets: The
other 31 subSaharan African
countries have narrow financial sectors,
in which most segments are
underdeveloped, and few financial
instruments. Access to global financial
markets has been non-existent or
severely limited; where capital markets
exist, they lack depth and liquidity.
Systemic and institutional constraints
have also contributed to a low level of
intermediation and limited availability of
financing for productive investments.
African financial system is essentially
dominated by commercial banks. Most of
the banks in Sub-Saharan Africa rely on
deposits to fund their loan portfolios
(which they keep on their books to
maturity); the interbank market is small;
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the market for securitized or derivative
instruments is either small or nonexistent, and few rely on foreign
borrowing to fund their lending
operations.
Preceding 1989, there were just eight
stock markets in Africa. In 2009 there are
nineteen stock exchanges. With the
exception of South Africa, most African
stock markets doubled their market
capitalization between 1992 and 2002.
Total market capitalization for African
markets increased from US$113,423
million to US$ 364,672 million between
1992 and 2007. African stock markets are
effectively small in size and illiquid, partly
a reflection of the low level of economic
activities. Thus, while the price-earnings
ratios for many African stock markets
were above their sectoral equivalents in
developed markets in 2007, the ongoing
global financial crisis act as a reminder
that what goes up eventually must come
down (Caprio and Kane, 2008).
Integration into international financial
markets has been a second important and
controversial aspect of financial-sector
policy over the past decades. Although
capital account restrictions are still in
place in many countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa, these
are often more de jure than
de facto. And while capital
account liberalisation has
many benefits, it has to be
managed carefully on the
macroeconomic level and
accompanied with
appropriate regulatory
policies (Kose et al., 2009).
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not eliminating, intra-regional capital
account restrictions can help overcome
the scale problem for financing large
projects, such as those in infrastructures.
While reducing dependence on
international capital markets to a certain
degree, such intra-regional capital
account liberalisation seems less risky
than complete capital account
liberalisation vis-à-vis international
investors.
Having gone through the cycle of
nationalizing and privatizing their banking
systems, more than half of the African
countries have banking market with either
a dominant or a significant share of
foreign-owned financial institutions.
Foreign bank entry has several
advantages that are specific to Africa:
international banks can help foster
governance, bring in much-needed
technology and experience from other
parts of the region, and help exploit scale
economies in their small host economies.
However, there are many factors that can
prevent countries from reaping the
potential benefits of foreign bank
ownership, such as the presence of
dominant government-owned banks that
reduce competitive pressures or the small

While there has been a
focus on opening capital
accounts toward
developed countries, the
potential of regional
financial integration has
been much less exploited,
although there are large
economies of scale to be
reaped by cooperation in
technical areas such as
harmonizing approaches
to bank regulation or
payment systems (World
Bank, 2007). Reducing, if
29

size of many financial markets in subSaharan African markets preventing the
necessary competitive pressure to
emerge. The result in many sub-Saharan
African countries has been a
concentration of both domestic and
foreign banks' portfolios on government
papers and international assets and
shying away from private sector lending.
Nevertheless, the new wave of foreign
bank entry after liberalisation in the 1990s
has seen not only the return of old colonial
banks but also some new important
players, such as several South African
banks, banks from non-African regions
other than Europe, and several regional
banks, such as the Bank of Africa, Zenith
Bank, Access Bank, United Bank of Africa
and Ecobank. Many of these new entrants
have put a much higher weight on
sustainable outreach, introducing new
products and technologies.
Banks in Africa have not been known for
their innovative and liberal banking
practices. Most banks are extremely
conservative and traditionally invested in
government securities and fixed assets.
However, in recent times, real private
sector credit, in particular, has been

Vol. 32, N0. 4

growing at an accelerating rate, and its
median value has doubled in the past
decade. Even as a share of GDP, it has
turned the corner, with the median share
approaching 18.0 percent in 2007, about
a third higher than at its anemic trough in
1996. Much of this increase was on the
back of innovative non-collateralized
lending practices (Geithner, 2007).
The reserves of small African central
banks are growing because of debt relief,
foreign aid, and other external inflows.
And while these reserves may be small in
absolute terms, the foreign currency
reserves may be huge relative to the
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losses on account of investing in hitherto
top rated financial institutions in
developed economies.
If this type of loss is more widespread, it is
likely to occur in central banks with no
overall policy for managing the Central
Bank's reserves in place; limited capacity
to oversee their relationship with their
fund managers and to monitor the market
risks or capable information technology
system for managing and monitoring the
reserves portfolio. Overall, the present
financial crisis has brought to the fore the
need to have a defined strategy to
manage African resources including the
external reserves.

overriding objective of securing monetary
and financial stability overwhelmingly
dictates the reserve management
decision. Overall safety and liquidity are
generally given prime consideration over
returns. Definitely, it is specifically in the
pursuit of this goal that central banks are
normally exposed to very huge exchange
rate risk.
To a large extent reserves management
at the level of the central bank has political
undertones. Thus, the domestic
governance environment and the central
bank's relationship with the government
and the body politic play an important role.
This is particularly so if higher volatility
(that could bring about temporary losses)
results from seeking higher returns, the
central bank may come under closer
public scrutiny including risk to its
reputation. Furthermore, regulations for
operational surplus remittances to the
government may reinforce aversion to
volatility.
Although individual country's policies
differ widely, they tend to be asymmetric.
In this regard, higher volatility of returns
available for distribution increases the
likelihood that central bank capital is
eroded over time. This, in turn, may be
perceived as undermining the central
bank's budgetary and operational
independence. Additionally, in some
countries an advance estimate of the
profit remittances to the government may
need to be provided. Such a practice is
also likely to constrain central banks from
investing in riskier assets whose income
flow cannot be forecasted with
reasonable degree of certainty.

economy. How they are managed is of
crucial importance. It has not been
uncommon, for some central banks to
place as much as 50.0 per cent of their
total reserves with external fund
managers on account of their own lack of
skills in reserve management. Following
the recent global financial crisis, at least
one African central bank has indicated
that it has suffered not negligible financial

The objectives and constraints of African
central banks, like most other central
banks in the developing countries are the
optimal asset composition of foreign
reserve portfolios. In principle the three
main objectives (safety, liquidity and
return) are usually trade-offs by the
central banks in their reserve
management decision. However, the
30

The first issue, and certainly the most
obvious one even to the casual observer
of central bank reserves management, is
the current explosion in reserves asset
growth. From a level of about $1.2 trillion
at end 2000, total world international
reserves exceed $2.9 trillion in 2008.
Such a pace of reserves accumulation is
unprecedented, and has generated
considerable interest in recent times.
What is particularly evident is that the
reserves accumulation is concentrated in
really very few hands. Most of the growth
is accounted for by less than ten major
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holders, mostly from Asia, and indeed no
less than seven Asian central banks now
have over $100 billion in reserves. And for
the first time, the bulk of international
reserves are held by developing /
industrializing countries.
Several reasons have been put forward
for this rapid growth in reserve assets. For
some countries, especially in Asia, it
signifies a desire to self-insure, following
the experience of financial crisis in the late
1990s. Secondly, sequel to the attainment
of the objective of rebuilding reserves,
there has been a desire to maintain given
exchange rates.
Finally, in the resource-rich countries, the
unprecedented increases in the world
commodity prices accounted for the
increase, given that in many cases,
domestic markets were unable to fully
absorb the revenue streams. Many oil
exporters especially find their domestic
markets at risk of overheating and choose
to keep a substantial proportion of their oil
revenues abroad. In all an interesting
development with regard to reserves
accumulation is that in several countries it
has moved from being a deliberate
objective of policy to a by-product of other
policies.
Consequently, some countries are
confronted with the dilemma of when the
continued increase in their reserves
ceases to be an undeniable benefit and
begin to pose its own challenges,
including the sterilization of domestic
credit expansion or the risks to the central
bank's own balance sheet from such large
unhedged positions. In other words, a
growing number of central banks have
had to mull two critical questions: how
much reserves is adequate, and how
much reserve is too much?
The next question that confronts central
banks is how to invest their reserves.
There are essentially two critical area of
concern, first a reliance exclusively on
traditional asset sectors such as money
markets and short duration government
bonds risks over-concentration in a
limited number of securities, and second,
as reserves levels grow and the need to
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keep the bulk of the assets fully liquid at all
times diminishes, the opportunity arises
to seek incremental revenue.
Admittedly, none of these concerns is
completely new. And the solution that
central banks have adopted:
diversification into new asset classes in
order both to reduce concentration risk
and enhance return, has a protracted
history. But the pace of the diversification
and the range of new asset classes that
central banks have invested in have
increased considerably in recent times. In
a recent survey of central banks, 80.0 per
cent of those that responded said that
they had added a wholly new asset class
to their reserves portfolio in the last 24
months, and some of the new sectors that
reserves managers have been studying
and investing in include MortgageBacked Securities (MBS), Asset-Backed
Securities (ABS), corporate bonds and
Equities (BIS, 2008).
Given the increasing diversification of
central bank reserves, several issues are
emerging. The first is does the official
sector have the required skills to manage
increasingly diverse portfolios? Several
countries have identified the need to
establish a specialist investment agency
to manage non-typical assets, though the
exact location of the dividing line between
what remains in the traditional central
bank portfolio and what is hived off into
the new investment portfolios is
inconclusive. Other central banks prefer
to keep all their assets in one place, but in
recognition of the limits to their internal
expertise they are increasingly willing to
outsource the actual management of the
assets to the private sector.
The second concern has to do with the
classes of assets and their suitability. For
instance, should some be considered
unsuitable whatever their financial
attractiveness in risk-return stipulations?
Today the boundaries appear to be
moving quite fast, as official sector asset
managers are looking at asset classes
that were considered hitherto to be
outside their normal domain. It is,
however, becoming increasingly obvious
that the abstinence from holding

3
Profits are remitted but losses do not lead to automatic recapitalization of the central bank
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obligations of another country's private
sector no longer holds. One enthralling
addition to the current debate is the use of
public or national assets to buy other
countries' private sector companies
outright. It is increasingly the developing
world which is seeking to purchase
companies in the developed world.
Whatever the political concerns
surrounding this issue, it could be argued
that purely on a portfolio risk management
basis, there are legitimate grounds for
asset-rich countries to seek real assets in
this way, not least to avoid the risk that
official sector debtors from the
industrialised countries will seek to
reduce their (nominal) liabilities through a
policy of inflation. It is not yet clear what
the consequences of this new investment
dynamic will be, and whether it is in fact
either optimal or even in some senses
legitimate for public sector asset
managers to push the boundary of riskreward maximization in this way. But the
subject is certain to remain a live one as
long as asset-rich states continue to look
to diversify their national wealth away
from portfolios consisting wholly of
securities and paper assets.
Another major challenge is the question of
the optimum currency allocation for
reserves. There are two main reasons
why this debate continues to occupy
market participants. The first is the simple
dynamic that it is by no means obvious
that, as reserves levels rise, the optimal
allocation of those reserves would remain
constant. As reserves grow, they
increasingly move from being mainly
pools of liquidity to a mix of liquidity and
investment, and while the US dollar
markets remain the preferred source of
central bank liquidity, the investment
universe is wider and other markets come
more and more into play.
Secondly, despite the seemingly
widening trade deficits of the US, creditor
nations of the United States are unable to
ignore the longer term consequences for
the dollar. The future value of the dollar is
central to this decision, and as reserves
managers move more and more into long
term investment and store-of wealth
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Drawing from the issues discussed
above, the critical challenges in investing
African reserves in the continent include:
inadequate capitalization of African
institution, especially; banks,
shallowness of the African financial
markets; non-convertibility of African
currencies; political and macroeconomic
instability.

With respect to political and economic
stability, African countries have had their
unfair share of instability. It is expected
that for a country or a currency to attract
patronage it should be seen to be stable
and the issuing authority must be an offshoot of a politically stable environment.
This has not been in abundant supply in
Africa.
IV.0
WAY FORWARD
In this segment we shall discuss in
practical terms drawing extensively from
the discussion above on the opportunities
available to the Africans to manage the
African external reserves.
The regional breakdown of reserves
buildup suggests a positive correlation
between reserves buildup on the one
hand and trade and output on the other.
On the average the East
Asia and Pacific region has accumulated
more foreign exchange reserves than
other developing regions over the last
decade. However, in addition to relatively
high trade-driven growth, the East Asia
and Pacific region witnessed the severest
financial crisis in the last two decades. In
this context analysts identify three factors,
beside high oil prices, for the buildup of

(US$)

With regards to the capitalization of the
African banks, the issue of foreign
reserves management as noted earlier is
critical for all the countries and the
institutions identified or entrusted with
such responsibility must be ones that are
big, strong and reliable. It will be
economically incorrect to allow an
institution with a paid up capital that is less
than the value of the external
reserves it is supposed to manage
Figure 4: Oil and Non Oil Producers
to participate in reserves
management for the country. In
the aftermath of the bank
consolidation exercise 2006, the
Nigerian authorities granted
selected commercial banks that
met certain conditions approval to
manage some fraction of the country's reserves in developing countries (ECB
external reserves. This is a model that 2006). /
could be adopted by other African
countries.
2000

2003

Oil Producers

Concerning the depth of the financial
market, the absence of robust and well
developed financial markets in Africa is
usually identified as the key constraint to
the development of financial products.
The non-convertibility of the African
currencies automatically implies that
none of these currencies can function as a
reserves currency. Consequently, most
African countries have their international
reserves in US dollars, Euro, pounds, etc.

2006

Non Oil Producers

The composition of African reserves
highlights high exposure of reserve

4
5

2007

Oil Producers /Africa (%)

To self-insure;

The desire to stop domestic overheating.
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holders to global financial risks. Over the
last few years, more than 95 per cent of
African non-gold reserves were held in
foreign exchanges including currency
(mainly the US dollar) plus deposits with
monetary authorities and banks and
securities (US/foreign government
securities, equity, bonds and notes,
money markets, derivatives). Thus the
value of African reserves can change with
fluctuations in the reserve currency
(especially the US dollar) or wider global
financial market fluctuations.
The safest reserve asset, treasury bills,
pays the lowest rates of return. Again this
makes efficient reserve management a
top priority for reserve holders. Private
capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa
reached over US$50 billionabout four
times larger than flows in 2000. Most
flows were directed to Nigeria and South
Africa, but the increases also reflect the
improved fundamentals elsewhere in the
region. In a small group of countries,
notably Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia,
portfolio flows have been on the rise,
attracted by improved risk ratings and
higher yields. Sub-Saharan African
countries have continued to reinforce
their financial systems. Banking systems
in much of the region are more
stable because many countries
(though not all) have liberalized
interest rates, rehabilitated banks,
and modernized the sector. Bank
credit to the private sector is
growing rapidly, but economies in
the region still lack financial depth.
(% )

portfolios, it is increasingly driving
attitudes to their preferred currency
allocation. The debate is not only about
the future consequences of these
imbalances, but also about their causes.
Two main theories have been identified:
one, the US current account deficit is
mainly a reaction to the excess of saving
in the developing world, and secondly that
the deficit is more home-grown, and the
result of excess US consumption.

Faster progress in increasing financial
intermediation would help foster private
investment and growth. The priorities

should be to increase access to formal
bank financing; eliminate distortions in
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monetary and fiscal policy that
discourage bank lending; strengthen
creditor rights and information sharing;
reduce reliance on unremunerated
reserve requirements as a monetary tool;
build domestic debt markets; improve the
risk management capacities of banks;
and encourage integration to increase
competition and use economies of scale.
One of the key advantages of investing
external reserves in Africa is obviously
income and asset diversification. Foreign
reserves are invested in more aggressive
asset classes vis a vis the usual G-7
sovereign bonds or commercial bank
deposits.
Admittedly, one main obstacle would
probably be the ill-preparedness of the
African domestic financial industry.
Africa's foreign reserves have been
reaching record highs. Along with global
demand for natural resources, this trend
could continue in the years to come. The
continent has a lot to gain from optimally
using those reserves. Apart from income
reasons, external reserves management
could be a way of developing the
domestic financial markets.
One of the critical requirements to
manage external reserves is adequate
capital base of the financial institution
concerned. As noted earlier, most
financial institutions in Africa are not
adequately capitalized. Therefore the
opportunity to manage the African
reserves by these institutions in the
current form is slim. The experience of
Nigeria cited earlier, where commercial
banks were given some portion of
reserves to manage after the recapitalization of the banks that resulted in
consolidation of the banks from over
eighty nine to just twenty-five is an
example that other African countries can
emulate. This has the twin impact of
aiding the advancement of the African
institutions as well as ensuring that the
realized profit from such venture is to a
large extent domiciled inAfrica.
The development of the financial sector
will also be realized through the
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opportunities that would be created
through the avenue of managing these
reserves byAfrican institutions. One quick
win would be to work towards the
integration of the existing capital markets
in the continent. In this way the African
countries that have excess reserves
could make same available to those
countries that have deficits. This will make
the African resources to work in and for
Africa. Admittedly, the immediate
constraint to this opportunity is the nonconvertibility of the African currencies.
This shortcoming, not withstanding, the
transactions in a reserve currency like the
US dollar could still be carried out on the
continent.
Overall, the opportunities abound but the
supporting infrastructures are relatively
inadequate. There is the urgent need to
work towards the upgrade of the critical
infrastructure that will aid the
management of the African reserves by
the African institutions and ensure that
African resources work for the
development ofAfrica.
V.0
Summary and Conclusion
The intention of this paper was essentially
on how to invest African reserves in the
continent. This paper underlined the
challenges and opportunities for
managing Africa's external reserves by
Africans after identifying several preconditions for a currency to emerge as
international currency. It is obvious that
these conditions have not yet crystallized
in Africa. Thus a lot of work is expected to
deepen and broaden the continent
financial system. Although African
external reserves have grown over time
the benefits of such growth in terms of
facilitation of domestic financial markets
and even the earning are not
commensurate with the reserves growth
rate. The non-convertibility of African
currencies, volatile macroeconomic and
sometimes volatile political environment
coupled with the shallowness of the
domestic markets are the main
challenges that are faced by the
continent. However, with recapitalization
of the African financial institutions
especially banks and the attainment of
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stable polity in both economic and political
fronts, there is hope for the continent's
institutions to take their rightful place in
the emerging global financial system by
first using the African resources as the
first step.
The involvement of creditable African
financial institutions in the management
of the reserves either within or outside
Africa will in no small measure strengthen
the development of the African financial
system but also ensure that a bulk of
African resources work for Africa as the
difference between what the current fund
managers paid to the African central
banks and what they actually get as
commission or profits will be retained
explicitly or implicitly inAfrica.
Africa's financial systems have seen
deepening and broadening over the past
years, the result not only of improvements
in the macroeconomic and institutional
framework, but also of the worldwide
liquidity glut, which directed more capital
flows into Africa. The current global crisis
threatens to reverse this trend and
undermine recent progress. In these
adverse circumstances, it is even more
important to upgrade the necessary
frameworks for sound, efficient, and
inclusive financial systems. This call for
further institution building as well as
cautious and case by case government
intervention to aid financial market
participants expand financial services to
the frontier of commercially sustainable
possibilities.
For better or worse, the future of Africa's
financial systems is closely linked to the
development of global finance, as are its
real economies. However, it is up to
Africa's financial sector stakeholders
bankers, donors, and policymakers to
guide financial sector reforms in a way
that maximizes Africa's opportunities,
learning both from their own experience
over the past 50 years and the experience
in other emerging and developed
economies. One of the ways to
accomplish this is to fast track regional
economic and monetary integration in
Africa as well as infrastructure upgrade.
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